Julian Morris: The premise of Copenhagen was always dubious. Some non-government organisations have billed it as the last chance to save the planet from anthropogenic global warming. Vested interests – such as those who have made money from the European emissions trading scheme – saw it as an essential vehicle for  perpetuating their business models. Both groups want binding restrictions imposed on future carbon emissions. But the economic cost of such restrictions would likely be far larger than the benefits. Given that premise, it would be better if Copenhagen were to end with no agreement.

Of course, it could have been otherwise: the Framework Convention on Climate Change requires parties to seek cost effective ways to address climate change. In principle, actions could be taken to reduce barriers to adaptation, for example. Many of these would cost little and would have significant advantages. But those barriers to adaptation often benefit the elite in poor countries. In Ethiopia for example, restrictions on property ownership and trade reinforce existing power structures. Foreign aid has a similar effect, since elites are able to use it to insulate themselves from democratic accountabilty. Indeed, it is no surprise that the version of adaptation promoted by political leaders in Copenhagen focuses only on what can be done by central government through aid-funded projects.

Given those political realities, the absence of substantive agreement during the first week is probably a good thing. The question is whether the stand-off can hold out till the end, or whether political leaders will feel obliged to agree to do “something”, no matter how counterproductive.

Julian Morris is an economist, author and director of The International Policy Network.

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